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Book Review
The Liberating Power of Symbols. Jürgen Habermas. (Trans. Peter Dews) Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001.
130 pages. $17.95 paper. ISBN 0-262-58205-8. The Postnational Constellation. Jürgen Habermas.
(Trans., edit. Max Pensky) Cambrige: MIT Press, 2001. 190 pages. $21.95 paper. ISBN 0-262-58206.6.
Jürgen Habermas is regarded by many philosophers as one of the most important thinkers of the latter
half of the 20th century, in terms of both breadth and depth. His writings, especially the two-volume
Theory of Communicative Action – considered by most as his magnum opus – display remarkable
intellectual rigor and acuity over a range of philosophical concerns. While known most prominently as a
social and political philosopher, Habermas has written a great amount on philosophy of language and
epistemology (or, reason) as well. With Apel and Rorty, Habermas has not only incorporated into his
own thinking positions and influences across the “analytic/ continental” philosophical divide, but he has
(like Apel and Rorty) striven for decades to bridge that divide, engaging with the thought of Quine and
Davidson with equal comfort and familiarity as with that of Heidegger and Lucaks. Associated primarily
with the Marxism-inspired Critical Theory movement, Habermas has written numerous works over the
past four decades shifting the assumptions of his predecessors from what he has called a philosophy of
consciousness to a philosophy of communication. The sustained development and analysis of his earlier
and more renowned works are not in the forefront in the present two books. Rather, The Liberating
Power of Symbols (LPS) is a collection of essays and speeches given on various occasions in the early-
and mid-1990s, and The Postnational Constellation (PC) is a collection of political essays written in the
mid- and late-1990s.
LPS is a collection of eight pieces, each focusing on the significance of the thought or influence of
an important European thinker. Some of these thinkers are known to most philosophers (even
English-speaking ones!), such as Ernst Cassirer, Karl Jaspers, Karl-Otto Apel, and Georg Henrik
von Wright; others are less known, such as Michael Theunissen and Alexander Kluge. Often less an
analysis and more an homage to the importance of these thinkers, the various essays nevertheless
identify themes and positions that philosophers generally recognize and embrace. For example, in
the title essay, on Cassirer, Habermas likens Cassirer’s contributions to semiotics and language
analysis to that of the early Wittgenstein, claiming it was indeed Cassirer more than Wittgenstein
who influenced a generation of German philosophers to make the “linguistic turn.” Following the
work of Wilhelm von Humboldt, it was Cassirer, says Habermas, who transformed “the world-
constituting activity of the knowing subject into the world-disclosing function of the trans-
subjective form of language” and “explode[d] the architectonic of the philosophy of consciousness
as a whole” (LPS, 15). That is, he stressed the intersubjective and pragmatic features of language
and communication as being equally important to a full analysis of language as are representational
and denotative features. Presaging much contemporary work in the pragmatics of language, Cassirer
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emphasized the metaphoric nature of language as well as the ontological commitments that are
ineliminable from language. These linguistic themes are picked up in the essay, “A Master Builder
with Hermeneutic Tact,” which was a speech given to commemorate the retirement of Karl-Otto
Apel. Like Cassirer (and Habermas), Apel wrote frequently on the communicative function of
language and its relation to representative and denotative functions. This essay is neither an analysis
nor a critique of such a position, but rather a commemoration.
Carrying the theme of communication, indeed the preconditions of communication, beyond the
analysis of language per se to the analysis of cultural understanding and interaction, Habermas
identifies the work of Karl Jaspers as providing a fruitful model of communication. Bringing in the
works of McIntyre, Rorty, and Rawls, in their rejection of a dichotomy between universalism (i.e., a
universal unity of reason) and relativism (i.e., all traditions regarding reason are incommensurable),
Habermas cites Jaspers’s concept of “existential communication” as sharing their commitment to
some form of contextualism (i.e., validity claims - criteria and standards of acceptability - are
neither unconditional nor subjective). For Habermas, the lesson of Jaspers’s model is that we
recognize “the horizon of the linguistically structured life-world, within which we always already
find ourselves. We find ourselves within it in three different respects: as self-asserting subjects in
the struggle for existence, as an impersonal consciousness in general in objectifying thought, and as
communicatively socialized – and thus also individuated – members of an ethical community held
together by shared ideas” (LPS, 38).
Keeping his focus on intercultural understanding, as well as his attention on the communicative
function of language, Habermas asks, in a discussion of the thought of Johann Baptist Metz, the
question: Where does anamnestic (reminiscent) reason belong (Israel or Athens)? That is, what is
the role of historicist-based understanding for theology and/or philosophy? His answer is, along the
same lines as those noted above in his discussion of Jaspers, that situated knowledge, with a “focus
of remembrance,” is neither subjective nor objective, but intersubjective, neither universalist nor
relativist, but contextualist. As Habermas puts it:
The Greek logos has transformed itself on its path from the intellectual contemplation of
the cosmos, via the self-reflection of the knowing subject, to a linguistically embodied
reason. It is no longer fixated on our cognitive dealings with the world – on being as
being, on the knowing of knowing, or the meaning of propositions which can be true or
false. Rather the idea of a covenant which promises justice to the people of God, and to
everyone who belongs to this people, a justice which extends through and beyond a
history of suffering, has been taken up in the idea of a community tied by a special
bond…Without this subversion of Greek metaphysics by notions of authentically Jewish
and Christian origin, we could not have developed that network of specifically modern
notions which come together in the thought of a reason which is both communicative
and historically situated. (LPS, 81-2)
By “that network of specifically modern notions” Habermas means notions of autonomy coupled
with socialized subjects, of liberation both in a descriptive sense of emancipation from degrading
conditions and in a normative sense of a utopian project of a harmonious form of life. Habermas
carries through these themes and this commitment of historically-situated contextualized reason,
mediated by and structured by the communicative function of language, in his other essays on the
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work of von Wright, Gershom Scholem, and Alexander Kluge.
The issues of cultural and intercultural understanding as seen through the lens of the communicative
function of language are made even more explicit (and more explicitly political) in The Postnational
Constellation. PC contains eight essays ranging from sweeping remarks on conceptions of
modernity to quite specific arguments regarding human cloning. With a strong connecting thread of
an analysis of “globalization” underlying the separate essays, Habermas extends his approach of
seeking the conditions of communication that is seen in LPS to the conditions for political
legitimacy here in PC. As editor Max Pensky notes, taken as a whole, this collection of essays
proposes the thesis that if the democratic process is to secure a basis for legitimacy beyond the
nation-state, it will be collective will-formation and not the State or the Market that will provide
this legitimacy. The first three essays (“What is a People?,” “On the Public Use of History,” and
“Learning from Catastrophe?”) all analyze how the notion of the State (or of a People) was socially
constructed, particularly in Germany. These analyses carry through Habermas’s on-going view
noted several times already of knowledge (in this case, identity) as being constructed in the context
of historical situations, that is, a Kantian-like focus on the conditions of knowledge, communication,
and in this instance political legitimacy.
The longest essay, nearly 1/3 of the entire volume, is “The Postnational Constellation and the
Future of Democracy.” Here Habermas lays out in greater detail his take on what globalization is
and how it is to be legitimated in the context of trans-national Markets and Democratic ideals (e.g.,
trans-national human rights). Fundamental modes of human interaction – interaction that is defining
of who we are – such as commerce, communication, culture, are all transcending national
boundaries and challenge the very relevance of the nation-state as a means of either understanding
or of handling and guiding such modes. It is the following essay, however, “Remarks on
Legitimation on Human Rights,” that would feel the most comfortable of the entire collection to
analytical philosophers, as it provides a more detailed and focused treatment of the nature of rights
and less in the way of what seem at times rather sweeping claims. He begins by identifying the
issue of political legitimation with procedural justification, i.e., laws. Laws are our collective means
of regulating behavior and by their very nature they are coercive. Their coerciveness is substantive
(i.e., they have content to them; they proscribe or prescribe specific behaviors), and in two ways:
(1) as laws of coercion, saying what we may not do and (2) as laws of freedom, saying what we
may do (and what others may not do with respect to us). This is reminiscent of the standard
Hohfeldian analysis of rights as powers (what we may do) and as immunities (what may not be
done to us). This raises the well-known concern of how to balance popular sovereignty and human
rights. What is particularly important about Habermas’s take on this issue is that he connects it to
his concerns about communication and conditions of legitimacy:
Now, if discourses (and bargaining processes) are the place where a reasonable political
will can develop, then the presumption of legitimate outcomes, which the democratic
procedure is supposed to justify, ultimately rests on an elaborate communicative
arrangement: the forms of communication necessary for a reasonable will-formation of
the political lawgiver, the conditions that ensure legitimacy, must be legally
institutionalized.
The desired internal relation between human rights and popular sovereignty consists in
this: human rights institutionalize the communicative conditions for a reasonable political
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will-formation. (PC, 117)
What this view shows is, once again, Habermas’s attempts to steer a course between universalism
and relativism, as, for him, rights are contextualized though not subjective (or even merely relative
to a given group).
The value of these two collections of essays lies not so much in providing an overview or even a
substantive, systematic presentation of Habermas to a new-comer to his thought. Nor does the value
lie in providing a sustained dialogue with analytic philosophers over any particular topic. His other,
more renowned works do that job (e.g., The Theory of Communicative Action, Knowledge and
Human Interests, Communication and the Evolution of Society, Moral Consciousness and
Communicative Action, Between Facts and Norms). The value of these two present volumes, rather,
lies in fleshing out his philosophical stances and commitments in the margins or borderlands of his
philosophical corpus. To that extent they are a revealing window into the more fruitful and more
developed works noted above.
David Boersema
Pacific University
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